Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2016

Makeshift Justice and Mootness: The Mauling of
FRCP Rule 68
Michelle Ferrare

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ferrare, Michelle, "Makeshift Justice and Mootness: The Mauling of FRCP Rule 68" (2016). Law School Student Scholarship. 719.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/719

Makeshift Justice and Mootness: The Mauling of FRCP Rule 68
Michelle Ferrare*
I.

Introduction

From inception, federal courts have been courts of limited jurisdiction.1 This
limitation stems from Article III, section II of the Constitution, which dictates that federal
courts may preside only over “cases” and “controversies.” 2 In developing the
implications of this requirement, federal courts have articulated the doctrines of mootness
and standing.3 Thus, they dismiss cases “[w]hen the issues presented in a case are no
longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, the case
becomes moot and the court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction.”4 In part, this
saves the Court’s resources, but it also adheres to the principles articulated by the
founding fathers in drafting of the Constitution.5 To meet the case or controversy
requirement of Article III, section II, a plaintiff’s complaint must establish that a dispute
involving “the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies” is at issue. 6 A plaintiff
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1
U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2.
2
U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, CL. 2.
3
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Though some of its elements express merely
prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”).
4
J. Evan Gibbs, Mooting the Mootness Issue As Moot?: Symczyk's Impact on FSLA Litigation in Florida
and Beyond, 87 FLA. Bar J. at 38, 40 (2013) (quoting Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 340 (3d
Cir. 2004)).
5
The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 374 (1974).
6
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 471(1982) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration,
113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
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may lose his personal stake in the suit when the defendant offers to surrender all that the
plaintiff is seeking in the litigation7.
Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in 1938 in attempt
to create uniformity among lower courts.8 Rule 68 was part of the original Federal Rules
but has been amended four times over the past six decades.9 It was designed to “to
encourage settlement and avoid litigation.”10 The rule allows a defending party to offer
settlement to the plaintiff.11 If the plaintiff accepts,12 the court will enter the judgment on
the terms of the offer.13 This judgment serves “as a resolution of the liability of the
defendant and has both res judicata and collateral estoppel effects upon the plaintiff's
claims.”14 If, on the other hand, the plaintiff declines the offer and continues to pursue

7

David Hill Koysza, Preventing Defendants from Mooting Class Actions by Picking Off Named Plaintiffs,
53 DUKE L.J. 781, 786 (2003); see Greisz v. Household Bank (Illinois), N.A., 176 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“Such an offer, by giving the plaintiff the equivalent of a default judgment … eliminates a legal
dispute upon which federal jurisdiction can be based.”).
8
See Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV.
757, 757 (1995) (“The lengthy debate that prefaced the adoption of the rules focused upon the value of a
national set of rules .... [T]he rules' proponents carried the day by arguing that procedure ought to be the
same across the federal courts ....”).
9
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 68 refer to and explain amendments to Rule 68 made in 1946,
1966, 1987, 2007 and 2009. The Committee’s Notes make it obvious that these amendments uniformly
have been changes of little consequence. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68 advisory committee’s notes.
10
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. at 5 (1985) (describing the Court’s interpretation of Rule 68’s purpose). See
also Delta Air Lines, Inc, 450 U.S. at 352 (“The purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage the settlement of
litigation.”).
11
FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (“a party defending against a claim may serve” an offer of judgment on an adverse
party”). See Delta Air Lines, Inc., 450 U.S. at 346 (“The Rule has no application to offers made by the
plaintiff.”).
12
FED. R. CIV. P. 68(A) (emphasis added) (“If, within 14 days after being served, the opposing party serves
written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof
of service. The clerk must then enter judgment.” (emphasis added)).
13
FED. R. CIV. P. 68
14
Michael E. Solimine & Bryan Pacheco, State Court Regulation of Offers of Judgment and Its Lessons for
Federal Practice, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 51, 54 (1997) (citing Gregory P. Crinion, Offers of
Judgment: The Federal Rule, 65 WIS. LAW. 30 (1992). While this was the first time a federal law had
included this type of provision, state legislatures had drafted similarly styled laws, which served as the
basis for Rule 68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 12A Charles A. Wright et
al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 577 (1982). Federal Rule 68 was modeled after 2 MINN. STAT. S
9323 (Mason 1927).
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the litigation, Rule 68 includes a cost-shifting provision, which may leave the plaintiff
liable for costs15 incurred by the defendant from the date of the offer forward.16
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should have resolved the circuit split
currently in existence on the effect of a Rule 68 offer as mooting a plaintiff’s claim when
the offer would provide the plaintiff with all the relief she would obtain were she
successful at trial. Part II of this Note presents an overview of the relevant case law, and
explains how appellate courts have interpreted Rule 68. That case law begins with the
Third Circuit decision in Weiss v. Regal Collections, where the court held that “an offer
for the entirety of a plaintiff's claim will generally moot the claim”17 when ruling on a
case implicating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Three years later, the Sixth
Circuit took a more moderate approach in a Fair Labor Standards Ac (FLSA) case,
O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., deciding that “an offer of judgment that satisfies a
plaintiff's entire demand moots the case,”18 but protecting the plaintiff’s interest by
requiring entry of an order pursuant to the defendant’s offer of judgment to ensure that
the plaintiff received the offered settlement.19
In 2013, the Supreme Court handed down Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk.20
Despite having the opportunity to settle the circuit split at this time, the Supreme Court
chose to defer ruling on the issue, reasoning that Symczyk had conceded this point when

15

Rule 68 does not define the term “costs.” The Supreme Court, however, has held that “costs” was
“intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or other
authority.” Marek, 473 U.S. at 9. “Costs” under Rule 68, therefore, depending on the underlying decisional
authority, may in appropriate instances include the defendants' post-offer attorney fees. See 12 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3006.2 at 131 (2d ed. 1997).
16
Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d).
17
Weiss, 385 F.3d at 340.
18
O'Brien,575 F.3d at 574.
19
Weiss, 385 F.3d at 340.
20
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1533.
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arguing in front of the circuit court. The result of this decision is a wider disparity in
application of Rule 68 between appellate decisions, and a lack of coherency for those
attempting to decipher the true meaning of the federal rule.
Later in 2013, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Diaz v. First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Corp.,
and deepened the circuit split. The Ninth Circuit relied upon Justice Kagan’s passionate
dissent in Genesis Healthcare Corp., and held that an unaccepted offer of judgment was a
legal nullity, insufficient to moot a plaintiff’s claim. Finally, Part II analyzes the most
recent decision from the Second Circuit in In Re Tremont Group Holdings in which the
court sided with the Seventh Circuit and determined that the defendant’s offer of
judgment served to moot the plaintiff’s claim. Part III analyzes Rule 68 by addressing the
ways circuit courts have misinterpreted the rule, and the problems associated with these
interpretations. Part IV concludes.
II.

Divergent Paths and Differing Appellate Analysis of the Application of
Rule 68
A. The Third Circuit Creates Controversy
In 2004 the Third Circuit became the first appellate court to hold that an

unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment could moot a plaintiff’s claim. 21 In Weiss, the
plaintiff brought a class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
seeking monetary relief, declaratory relief, and an injunction against the defendant. 22 The
defendant debt collection company, Regal Collections, made an offer of judgment to
Weiss prior to her filing for class certification.23 The offer was for the full amount

21

Weiss, 385 F.3d at 340.
Id.
23
Id.
22
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recoverable by her under the FDPA, $1,000.24 The offer of judgment did not touch upon
the other forms of relief that Weiss was seeking. Even though plaintiff did not accept the
offer, the District Court dismissed Weiss’s claims as moot.25 Arguing on appeal to the
Third Circuit, Weiss contended that the offer of judgment did not constitute full relief
because it did not provide all forms of relief sought in the complaint. 26 The Third Circuit
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the other relief sought in the complaint, and
affirmed the dismissal. The plaintiff never received the $1,000 she had been offered.27
B. The Sixth Circuit Attempts a Moderate Approach
In 2009 the Sixth Circuit took a more moderate approach than the Third Circuit
had previously adopted. In O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc. the O’Brien
instituted action against her employer, claiming the defendant was in violation of the Fair
Labor and Standards Act (FLSA). The majority agreed with the Third Circuit, which
had held that that “an offer of judgment that satisfies a plaintiff's entire demand moots the
case.”28 But the court refused to go as far as the Third Circuit in mooting the case
regardless of whether plaintiff ever received any compensation. Instead, the Sixth Circuit
adopted a more moderate approach, holding that the appropriate response is to “enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in accordance with the defendants' Rule 68 offer of
judgment.”29
C. The Supreme Court Punts on the Issue

24

Id.
Weiss, 385 F.3d at 340.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
O'Brien., 575 F.3d at 574.
29
Id. at 575.
25
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In 2013 the Supreme Court failed to address the issue of whether a defendant’s
unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment moots a Plaintiff’s claim when it offers full relief.
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk recognized a growing circuit split on the issue.30
Despite awareness of the inconsistent applications of Rule 68 in lower courts, the
Supreme Court chose to punt by handing down a limited, fact-specific holding which
offered little guidance to circuit courts attempting to resolve whether an unaccepted offer
of judgment had the ability to moot a plaintiff’s claim.31
Petitioner was the class representative in a class action suit and alleged that the
defendants had violated the FLSA by failing to pay compensation to employees for work
completed during lunch and dinner breaks.32 The Defendants served the plaintiff with a
Rule 68 offer of judgment in the amount of $7,500, meant to represent all of her lost
wages.33 The Plaintiff did not acknowledge the offer within the ten-day window, and the
Defendant moved to dismiss the suit, claiming that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because the claim was moot under Article III’s case or controversy
requirement.34 The District Court held that the plaintiff’s claim was fully satisfied by the
Rule 68 offer and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The plaintiff was not awarded any form of relief.35
The Third Circuit reversed in part, reasoning that the District Court’s decision
would undermine the judicial process. Specifically, it feared that the holding would
allow class representative plaintiffs to be picked off "with strategic Rule 68 offers before
30

See Genesis HealthCare, 133 S. Ct. at 1528-29 (“Courts of Appeals disagree whether an unaccepted offer
that fully satisfies a plaintiffs claim is sufficient to render the claim moot.”).
31
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1533.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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certification could short circuit the process, and, thereby, frustrate the goals of collective
actions."36 It held that if, on remand, the District Court found that the plaintiff’s motion
to certify the action as a class action was untimely, or failed on the merits, the Rule 68
offer of judgment would render the plaintiff’s claim moot.37 This signified a shift from
their previous holding in Weiss, at least for class actions.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court failed to address the central issue of whether an
unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment can render a plaintiff’s claim moot. Although
recognizing the circuit split on the issue, the Supreme Court stopped short of providing a
resolution, simply stating that “the issue is not properly before us” because the
respondent had waived it.38 Given that waiver, the majority held that the plaintiff’s suit
became moot “because she lacked any personal interest in representing others in this
action…the mere presence of collective-action allegations in the complaint cannot save
the suit from mootness once the individual claim is satisfied.”39
Justice Kagan filed a passionate dissent, accusing the majority of sidestepping the
proper issue.40 Unwilling to accept that the plaintiff’s claim was moot, Justice Kagan
stated that “an unaccepted settlement offer—like any unaccepted contract offer—is a
legal nullity, with no operative effect.”41 She relied on a Supreme Court decision from
the 2012 term, in which the Court held that “[a]s long as the parties have a concrete
interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” 42

36

Id. at 1527.
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2013).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
133 S.Ct. 1523, 1532-37 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
41
Id. at 1532 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
42
Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 1023, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012)
37
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Justice Kagan viewed Rule 68 as allowing a plaintiff to reject an offer of
settlement since paragraph (d) of the rule establishes that, after a rejection, the litigation
continues, with the possibly penalty of costs.43 From this, Justice Kagan concluded that
the rule "provides no appropriate mechanism for a court to terminate a lawsuit without
the plaintiff’s consent."44 Finally, and most powerfully, she stated that the rule itself
provides that “[a]n unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn.” 45 The failure to address
the substantive issue of the case limited the usefulness of the Supreme Court’s holding,
and ensured that this would not be the end of the battle over whether an unaccepted Rule
68 offer of judgment can moot a plaintiff’s claim.
Despite this, circuit courts have not shied away from the issue. In contrast to the
Supreme Court, appellate courts have written intricate opinions providing explanation as
to the way in which they have been grappling with the rule. The Supreme Court’s lack of
direction has splintered lowered courts, and created a deepening circuit split on the issue.
D. The Ninth Circuit Gives the Nod to Nullification and Aligns with
Justice Kagan
The Ninth Circuit was the next appellate court to weigh in on the issue of whether
an unaccepted offer of judgment can render a plaintiff’s claim moot.46 Faced with a
homeowner plaintiff claiming breach of contract and misrepresentation against her
insurance company, the complaint reached the Ninth Circuit on appeal after the plaintiff

43

Mike Dorf, Was Justice Kagan's Snarkiness in Genesis Healthcare v. Symczyk Justified?, DORF ON
LAW (July 22, 2013, 3:22), available at http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/07/was-justice-kagans-snarkinessin.html.
43
Genesis Healthcare Corp., at 1533–34 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
44
Id. at 1534 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
45
FED. R. CIV. P. 68(b).
46
The Ninth Circuit had faced a similar issue in Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc. No. 10-15965, 2011 WL
3449473 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2011)).
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allowed a Rule 68 offer of judgment to expire.47 The defendant claimed that the
unaccepted offer would have provided the plaintiff with full relief, and the plaintiff’s
failure to accept the offer rendered the claim moot because there was no remaining
controversy.48
The District Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiff
appealed to the Ninth Circuit,49 which held that “an unaccepted Rule 68 offer that would
fully satisfy a plaintiff's claim is insufficient to render the claim moot.”50 This holding
was deferential towards of the purpose and language of the rule, and respectful of the
principles of the mootness doctrine, which provide that “[a] case becomes moot only
when it is impossible for a court to grant ‘any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing
party’. ” 51 This holding was the first time an appellate court had deemed Rule 68
incapable of mooting a plaintiff’s claim. In doing so, the majority borrowed directly
from Justice Kagan’s dissent in Genesis Healthcare Corp..52
E. The Second Circuit Deepens the Division
In July 2014, petitioners in In Re Tremont Group Holdings petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari, claiming that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals wrongly
dismissed their claims as moot.53 Its investors sued Tremont, an investment group, after
the news of Bernie Madoff’s ponzi scheme broke. They alleged that Tremont breached its

47

Diaz v. First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Corp., 732 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id at 950.
51
Diaz, 732 F.3d at 954-55 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, ––– U.S. ––––,
132 S.Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) (quoting City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)).
52
Diaz., 732 F.3d at 948.
53
In re Tremont Sec. Law, State Law & Ins. Litig., 542 F. App'x 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2013).
48
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duty of care for failure to properly vet Madoff and that the Group heavily participated in
the fraudulent funds without properly determining the “value, source or existence.”54
Tremont attempted to settle with Haines and Zamrowski in May of 2012, and offered
the petitioners $130,00055 in a Rule 68 offer of judgment, with the amount meant to
represent the petitioners’ full losses, plus interest.56 The petitioners returned the check
and rejected the offer within ten days.57 They claimed that the amount offered by
Tremont did not cover their full claim because it did not account for attorney’s fees and
court fees, nor did it account for “the class of individuals whom petitioners were
representing.”58
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Tremont argued that the district court did not
have jurisdiction under Article III after the Rule 68 offer because that offer rendered the
plaintiffs’ claims moot. 59 Petitioners countered that it would have been unethical to
accept an offer that failed to address the entire class, and that the offer itself did not make
the plaintiffs whole. Petitioners argued that the “class action does not become moot upon
offer of tender to the named plaintiff because the plaintiff still has a ‘personal stake’ in
obtaining class certification on appeal.” 60
The Second Circuit rejected the Petitioners’ reasoning, stating that neither Haines
nor Zamrowski were class representatives, and therefore did not have a duty to represent
interests of the class.61 The Court then went on to affirm the dismissal of the Petitioners’

54

Id.
Id.
56
Id.
57
In re Tremont Sec. Law, State Law & Ins. Litig., 542 F. App'x 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2013).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Deposit Guaranty National Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
61
In re Tremont Sec. Law, State Law & Ins. Litig., 542 F. App'x 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2013).
55
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claim as moot, relying on a case from the Seventh Circuit which held “[O]nce the
defendant offers to satisfy the plaintiff's entire demand, there is no dispute over which to
litigate ... because he has no remaining stake.”62 The order dismissing the Petitioners’
claim did not require Tremont to reinstate its offer or pay the $130,000 it had offered
back in October.
The Petitioners responded by petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari.63 With the
Second, Seventh, Ninth, Third and Sixth Circuits producing three different resolutions to
the issue, the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in In Re Tremont Holdings
and capitalized on the opportunity to resolve the split. Instead, the Supreme Court denied
the petition.64 The Supreme Court should have established that a Rule 68 unaccepted
offer of relief cannot render a plaintiff’s claim moot because an unaccepted offer is a
legal nullity and a legal nullity does not have the power to render a plaintiff’s claim moot.
III.

Analysis
A. The Language of Rule 68 and Misconceptions of the Rule
Rule 68 consists of four parts.65 Most pertinent to this note is paragraph (b),

which reads “An unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn, but it does not preclude a
later offer. Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to
determine costs.”66 This note argues that it is illogical to find that an unaccepted offer
eliminates a plaintiff’s interest in his or her claim because the rule explicitly states that an
unaccepted offer is withdrawn.67 The rule goes further to pronounce the withdrawn offer

62

Id (quoting Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 656 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir.2011)).
Haines v. Arthur E. Lange Revocable Trust, 135 S. Ct. 270 (2014)
64
Id.
65
Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.
66
Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(b).
67
Id.
63
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inadmissible outside of a proceeding to determine costs.68 These statements definitively
limit the power of the unaccepted offer to a specific realm, one that does not include
mooting a plaintiff’s claim. Even if one accepts the misguided premise that an
unaccepted offer of judgment does render a plaintiff’s claim moot, any resultant dismissal
would have to somehow revive the offer that arguably mooted the plaintiff’s claim.69
Dismissing a claim for mootness based on an offer that is no longer open means that the
court is rejecting a claim when the plaintiff still has a case or controversy and a
significant interest in the litigation.
The Supreme Court, lower courts and legal commentators, agree that the purpose
of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement.70 The Supreme Court has highlighted this fact
itself, stating, “the plain purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement and avoid
litigation.” 71 By including a cost-shifting provision, Congress intended to ensure that, if
a plaintiff in bad faith, or poor legal judgment, continues litigation which results in an
award that is equal or less than the defendant’s previous offer of judgment, the plaintiff is
responsible for costs incurred by the defendant after the rejection of the offer.72 At its
core, the provision makes an unreasonable plaintiff bear the burden of liability for his or
her irrationality.73
The cost-shifting provision “can be a powerful motivator for a recalcitrant
plaintiff to seriously consider proposed terms of settlement and avoid the need for

68

Fed. R. Civ. P 68 (d)
See infra.
70
Marek, 473 U.S. at 5 (describing the Court’s interpretation of Rule 68’s purpose). See also Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 450 U.S. at 352 (1981) (“The purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage the settlement of litigation.”).
71
Marek, 473 U.S. at 5.
72
David A. Anderson & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Empirical Evidence on Settlement Devices: Does Rule 68
Encourage Settlement?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519, 521 (1995)
73
Id.
69
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protracted litigation.” 74 By penning part (d), legislatures put plaintiffs on notice that
unreasonable continuation of as case would result in cost-shifting and unfavorable
financial repercussions.75
If the drafters intended for an unaccepted offer of judgment for full relief to moot
a plaintiff’s claim, it would have been unnecessary to include a cost-shifting provision in
the rule, as the litigation would have presumably ended after the rejection of the offer.
Additionally, if the drafters of the rule intended Rule 68 to have a lawsuit termination
mechanism, one could have been explicitly drafted into the provisions of the rule. There
is a counter-argument that an interpretation of the Constitution that supports lawsuit
termination mechanism would supersede legislation intent. This note concedes that if the
Supreme Court were to come to the conclusion that an unaccepted offer can moot a
plaintiff’s claim, legislative intent would be an irrelevant consideration.
Finally, Congress has amended Rule 68 on four separate occasions.76 Proposed
amendments to an existing Rule undergo “at least seven stages of formal comment and
review, in a process involving five separate institutions: the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the Supreme Court, and Congress.”77 Therefore, this
rule has received critical, and careful analysis on four separate occasions since its
inception. The rule establishes that an unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn, and

74

Andrew L. Turscak, Jr., Litigation Strategy, Cost-Shifting and Offers of Judgment: The Underutilized
Rule 68 Device, AM. BANKR. INST. J., April 2011, at 42, 91.
75
The cost-shifting provision of Rule 68 (d) is not triggered if judgment is in favor of the defendant. Delta
Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981). This holding has been critiqued as arbitrary and
contrary to the rule's purpose. See J. Karen Arnold, Note, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August: Taking the Teeth
out of Rule 68, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 765, 765 (1982).
76
See Note 6, infra.
77
Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2002).
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articulates cost-shifting provisions in the case that the plaintiff refuses an offer that turns
out to be better than the final resolution plaintiff receives from litigation.78 There is
simply no evidence in any of this history of intent to allow a Rule 68 offer to moot a case.
The congressional silence on the issue suggests what this note argues: the rule is meant to
promote settlement rather than force settlement. This is a reasonable interpretation given
the Supreme Court’s continued deference to this language.
The goal of promoting settlement is evidenced by the risks that drafters associated
with the failure to accept a reasonable offer. For example, a plaintiff who rejects an offer
under Rule 68 risks having to pay the costs the defendant incurred after the offer. Further,
this plaintiff will not be permitted “to recover its own post-offer costs, even if he or she
prevails in judgment.”79 Thus, the Supreme Court in Maerk stated “Civil rights plaintiffs
- along with other plaintiffs - who reject an offer more favorable than what is thereafter
recovered at trial will not recover attorney's fees for services performed after the offer is
rejected.” 80 Thus, plaintiffs who fail to accept an offer will suffer downstream
ramifications.81 At no point in the explanation of these risks or ramifications does the
decision touch upon the risk of being forced to accept the settlement.
B. Two Interpretations of One Rule: Emphasizing Congressional Intent Over
Judicial Lawmaking
In his article titled “To Encourage Settlement: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and
the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” Robert Bone argues that there are

78

FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d).
Ian H. Fisher, Federal Rule 68, A Defendant's Subtle Weapon: Its Use and Pitfalls, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J.
89, 91 (2001).
80
See Marek, 473 U.S. at 6.
81
Id.
79
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two models of Rule 68,82 the settlement promotion model and the unreasonable plaintiff
model.83 Bone writes that the settlement promotion model is premised on the idea that
settlement of litigation is “desirable and ought to be encouraged because it saves
litigation costs and produces a mutually agreeable resolution.”84 The unreasonable
plaintiff model has a separate focus, which “is on continuing to litigate a suit
unreasonably.”85
Bone argues that, even under the unreasonable plaintiff model, a plaintiff is within
his or her right to continue litigating a claim even after an unaccepted offer of judgment
which would provide the plaintiff full relief.86 Just because a plaintiff rejects an offer for
full relief, plaintiff may not be unreasonable. Bone argues that “litigation is a gamble,
and perfect reasonable gambling choices do not always succeed.87 When a plaintiff
believes that a defendant’s offer is less than the recourse she can receive through
continued litigation, she has the right to pursue that good faith belief because it is
impossible to know the necessity of continued litigation without verification at trial.88 If
a judge is convinced that no reasonable juror would award the plaintiff more than what is
being offered, the judge needs to require by order that the defendant pay the plaintiff the

82

Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW U. L. REV. 1561, 1566 (2008). See also Jay Horowitz, Rule 68:
The Settlement Promotion Tool That Has Not Promoted Settlements, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 485, 490 (2010).
83
Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW U. L. REV. 1561, 1566 (2008).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW U. L. REV. 1561, 1566 (2008).
87
Id.
88
Id. (“When the party does her best to predict the outcome but the outcome turns out differently from her
prediction, the resulting litigation costs may become unnecessary ex-post, but that does not make them
unnecessary ex-ante, nor does it make the party’s rejection of the offer unreasonable in any meaningful
sense.”).
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amount offered, rather than allowing the defendant to walk away from the litigation
without compensating the plaintiff, as has occurred in decisions discussed in this article.
In concluding that a plaintiff is entitled to continue litigation even if a court later
determines the continuance unnecessary or irrational, Bone relies on the language of Rule
68; specifically the cost shifting measures provided in part (d), which “protects a
defendant from an unreasonable plaintiff.”89
As applied to the mootness question, the Supreme Court does not need to
establish extra safeguards that have not been approved by Congress because Congress has
explicitly drafted language in the rule as a safety valve for Defendants who are forced to
continue defending a claim after offering full relief to an unreasonable plaintiff. If the
threat and use of unreasonable litigation was a serious social problem, lawmakers have
the ability to respond through the legislative process and amend Rule 68.90
C. Applying Contract Principles to Offers of Judgment
The Supreme Court has held that offers of judgment “be governed by background
contract principles.”91 In other instances, the Court has applied contract principles to
determine when, and if, an offer of judgment is revocable.92 The Court’s use of contract

89

Id.
Brandon T. McDonough, Subject Matter Jurisdiction Peek-A-Boo the Confusing State of Rule 68, BENCH
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principles as the backbone of Rule 68 is significant. Future litigants should be able to
look to these same principles when attempting to clarify others aspects of the rule.93
General principles of contract law dictate that an offeree’s offer, “generally gives
the second party the power to accept that offer and create a binding contract unless it is
revoked before acceptance occurs.” 94 Further, contract law also states that an
unaccepted offer has no legal effect, and is a legal nullity.95 For example, in Rogers v.
United States,96 the Court held that an unaccepted offer from the government to the
Cherokee Indians “which, not having been assented to by the eastern Cherokees, is now a
mere nullity.”97
Stemming from this awareness, Rule 68 itself states that an unaccepted offer is
not admissible into evidence, asserting, “A plaintiff may not introduce evidence of a Rule
68 offer as evidence at trial for liability or damages. Rather, it may only be introduced to
the court in a proceeding to determine collateral matters like costs or attorney's fees.”98
This language evidences congressional intent to apply contractual principles to the
interpretation of the rule, as the language symmetrically aligns with contractual
principles.99 By allowing defendants to use the unaccepted offer in a manner that defies
the language of the rule, and the supporting legal principles governing the rule, some
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courts have entirely sidestepped the legislative intent, and embarked on their own judicial
lawmaking adventure.
D. Placing Emphasis on Litigant’s Rights
Some courts argue that allowing an unaccepted offer of full relief to moot a
plaintiff’s claim promotes fairness and minimizes unnecessary and resource-consuming
litigation. It is undeniable that removing a case from the docket of the court reduces
litigation and in turn saves judicial resources. But the improper removal of a plaintiff’s
case from the judicial system undercuts the purpose of the system itself and reduces a
plaintiff’s confidence in the legal process.100 When circuit courts dismiss a plaintiff’s
claim with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and do not address the fact
that the plaintiff has still not been compensated for her injury, the unfairness is evident.
Resources should be allocated towards litigating claims in which the plaintiff has not yet
been compensated.101 This implicates cases where the plaintiff has not accepted an offer
of judgment or settlement, as the plaintiff has not yet been made whole, and should be
provided the opportunity to argue for compensation. The Supreme Court should not be
persuaded by the incomplete argument that a broad interpretation of Rule 68 is best for
the judicial system because dismissing suits will reduce the court’s workload. Instead, the
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Supreme Court should be influenced by the ramifications that dismissing lawful
complaints could have on the entire judicial process.
Further, if one accepts the mootness premise, the court was divested of subject
matter jurisdiction at the moment that the defendant offered the plaintiff full relief.102
Consequently, this implies that the court lacks the ability to order the parties to complete
any action in the dismissal order. If the dismissal order does not require payment, and
after the dismissal order, the offeror decides not to pay, the plaintiff is forced to go back
to the court and attempt to remedy the situation. Unless the plaintiff accepted, the failure
to follow through on the offer would not be a breach of contract, which would leave the
plaintiff’s only recourse to attempt to reinstate the original complaint, and explain the
defendant’s deficient conduct. This frustrating scenario, where the defendant’s intention
to pay was not sincere, has occurred.103 While the plaintiff is not precluded from
returning to court if his or her claims remain uncompensated by the defendant after
dismissal because the case or controversy springs back, finding mootness to this situation
creates a maddening, cyclical process.
Some district courts have explicitly addressed this issue. For example, a potential
return to court was expressly contemplated by the disposition in Rollins v. Sys.
Integration, Inc.:104 “Should Systems Integration fail to pay Rollins in accordance with
its offer of judgment, Rollins is free to re-file his suit.”105 The offeror could renew the
offer after the plaintiff returns to court, once again divesting the court of subject matter
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jurisdiction, forcing the court to dismiss the action. If the offeror again refuses to pay per
the terms of the offer, the plaintiff must again institute action.106 This sequence could, in
theory, continue endlessly. This process does not serve the purposes of Rule 68 but
rather frustrates them.
This cycle also may demonstrate that an unaccepted offer of judgment does not
divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction because of an established exception to the
mootness doctrine, “capable of repetition yet evading review.”107 This exception to
mootness applies in cases where a named plaintiff had a live claim at the time a
complaint was filed, and where the claim may arise again with respect to that plaintiff;
the litigation then may continue notwithstanding the named plaintiff‘s current lack of a
personal stake. This exception to the mootness doctrine allows the court to decide a suit,
despite inherent justiciability issues if the issue is “(1) ‘of a type likely to happen to the
plaintiff again,’ and (2) ‘of inherently limited duration so that it is likely to always
become moot before federal court litigation is completed.’” 108 If a plaintiff must
continuously bring a defendant to court, only to find that the claim is dismissed because
of the mootness doctrine, (as in the previous example of a defendant who fails to conform
to the terms of his or her offer of judgment), a plaintiff’s claim would fall within this
exception. This would mean that an unaccepted offer of judgment does not divest the
court of subject matter jurisdiction because, without a court order ordering the defendant
to adhere to the terms of the offer, the plaintiff is tossed out of court with little protection.
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E. Shortcomings of Proposed Solutions to the “Buy-Off Problem”
The ability of a defendant to moot a plaintiff’s claim with an unaccepted offer of
judgment creates the “Buy-Off Problem.109 This term refers to the concern that
defendants facing a possible class-action suit would have the ability to “moot each
successive case before a decision on certification is reached, and that the defendants
would essentially have the option to preclude a viable class action, at his or her sole
discretion, from ever reaching the certification stage.” 110
Generally, plaintiffs can sue individually, or join with other parties who have
claims arising under a similar set of facts or circumstances. In this situation the judge is
able to address all parties and determine the set of facts on which the claims rest. In the
class action context, the judge faces a unique situation. He or she must rely almost
entirely on the class certification evidence to determine whether there are absent parties
that are similarly situated to the class representative filing suit. Therefore, the named
representative must offer proof that a class exists at the time of certification.
The “Buy- Off Problem”111 would undermine the class action process by creating
a barrier between named plaintiffs and class-action certification.112 Consequently, for an
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offer of judgment to have effect upon the justiciability of the class action as a whole, the
offer must be delivered prior to the plaintiff’s motion for class certification.113 Some
commentators have gone as far as to argue that Rule 68 is designed for use by single
defendant in a case involving a single plaintiff, and is not meant to be applied in the class
action setting.114 Some courts have even held that aspects of Rule 68 cannot be applied
to class action suits115 because of the disparate burdens116 the rule would place on class
representatives.117
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not compel a plaintiff to immediately file
a motion for certification.118 Rule 23(c)(1)(A) necessitates only that the motion is filed
“at an early practicable time after a person sues….as a class representative.”119 Allowing
defendants to force plaintiffs into filing a motion for class certification by recognizing

plaintiff seeking to represent a class.”); See McDowall, 216 F.R.D. at 48; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), 28
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that a Rule 68 offer may moot the individual’s claim and thus prevent class certification
would undermine the plaintiff’s statutory right.120
The “Buy-Off Problem” also places future members of the not-yet-certified class
at risk of being deprived of the chance to recover under the class action mechanism121
because defendants facing a possible class action suit may prevent such persons from
being class representatives by mooting their individual claim.122 This practice undercuts
judicial efficiency, and undermines the policy goals of class actions123 “because allowing
plaintiffs to be ‘picked off’ before a class is certified may waste judicial resources by
‘stimulating successive suits brought by others claiming [the same] aggrievement.’124
Class actions are vital to the judicial process125, and a plaintiff’s ability to have his
or her action certified is an important tool in the litigation process.126 Some courts,
including the Seventh Circuit, see a viable to solution to the “buy-off” problem.127 The
Seventh Circuit believes this solution would preserve litigants’ rights while also allowing
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unaccepted offers of judgment to moot a plaintiff’s claim.128 The court contends that, by
allowing representative plaintiffs to move to certify their suit as a class action at the time
the complaint is filed, the buy-off problem can be adverted. 129 This resolution interprets
the mootness doctrine as “flexible.”130 This interpretation implies that, while a
plaintiff’s claim may be moot, the court will allow a plaintiff time to establish facts
necessary for certification.131 This suggests that two plaintiffs with the same claims may
receive different treatment, and disparate results, depending if one plaintiff is able to
certify her claim as a class action.
This suggestion, besides adding an unnecessary and premature matter to the
courts’ docket, falls short of being a practical solution because it fails to address the
plaintiff’s burden in certifying and maintaining a class action,132 and the requisite time
and effort required to ascertain all information that would be necessary for the plaintiff to
achieve certification of the class.133 This proposal may result in plaintiffs being unable to
obtain certification for class actions that otherwise would have been certified in due time,
because the plaintiff was rushed to achieve certification, and did not have proper time to
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discover all relevant information.134 This is an unfavorable outcome, as courts have
already stated their preference for allowing the class-action process to ‘play out’135
because of the important role that class action suits play in the legal system.136
The Seventh Circuit addressed the argument that a rushed certification process
may have potential to harm the plaintiff, and undermine plaintiffs’ rights. It countered
that a plaintiff could request a delay from the district court for additional discovery.137
Despite the Seventh Circuit’s suggestions, a delay for additional discovery before
certification presents a separate, significant problem.138 The Seventh Circuit is
essentially advising a plaintiff to file a consciously inadequate motion with the plaintiff’s
complaint, followed by a stay to provide time for proper discovery to be accompanied.
After the completion of this discovery stage (which could plausibly take months, if not
years), the plaintiff should file the ‘real’ motion that will more accurate reflect the
available evidence. This process would force district courts to “conduct the pointless
evaluation of a proxy certification motion and the inevitable motion for stay to permit
discovery.”139 This would result in a waste of judicial resources, and would undermine
the values upon which Rule 68 is premised.
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Rather than prematurely forcing a plaintiff’s hand in a way that may have
damaging ramifications on future class members, or denying plaintiffs full opportunity to
argue their interests in a court of law, the Supreme Court should adopt a rule which states
that an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment does not render a plaintiff’s claim moot.
F. The Problems with the Sixth Circuit’s Moderate Approach
The Sixth Circuit has attempted to interpret Rule 68 in a way that protects
litigants, and preserves the values of the mootness doctrine.140 This more moderate
approach requires the defendant to reinstate his offer of judgment to prevail on a
mootness claim.141 The court will then enter judgment against the defendant142,
providing the plaintiff with the relief offered, and the litigation will concluded.143 The
Sixth Circuit also would not allow mootness once a class was certified – or a motion for
certification was filed.144 While requiring the defendant to reinstate his offer is obviously
fairer than the Second Circuit’s approach, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation still fails to
address the underlying issue; the plaintiff has not been given the opportunity to fully
litigate his or her claim in a court of law. This opportunity is a procedural centerpiece of
the American legal system, and denial of this right can have serious consequences,
including establishing a slippery slope that erodes litigants’ rights.
Despite its shortcomings, the Sixth Court has gone farther than other appellate
courts. Specifically, the court attempts to protect plaintiffs’ rights, while also
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appropriately addressing the limitations of Rule 68 in the context of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit explains that “if a tender made to the individual plaintiff
while the motion for certification is pending could prevent the courts from ever reaching
the class action issues, that opportunity is at the mercy of a defendant, even in cases
where a class action would be most clearly appropriate.” 145 The court is obviously
concerned about providing defendants with too much power over a litigant’s claim.146
This fear should extend beyond the class action context.147 The ramifications of enabling
defendants to engage in posturing that precludes litigation from reaching a point in which
the issues are best presented to the court undercuts a lead plaintiff’s role in fully
exploring potential class action claims.
The Sixth Circuit’s moderate approach fails to treat similarly situated plaintiffs in
analogous manners.148 Two plaintiffs with identical claims can have disparately different
outcomes depending on how quickly they petition the court for certification. Defendants
will undoubtedly grow wise to the loophole in the Sixth Circuit’s holdings. Rather than
waiting to see if the individual claim remains a lone, sole suit, or manifests into a larger
class action, defendants will act quickly, and will offer a Rule 68 offer of judgment on the
individual plaintiff’s claim before the plaintiff has the ability to petition the court for
certification. The result is, once again, the “Buy-Off Problem.”149
V. Conclusion
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The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in In Re Tremont Holdings and
should have resolved the current circuit split by establishing that an unaccepted Rule 68
offer of judgment does not render a plaintiff’s claim moot because an unaccepted offer is
a legal nullity, and the plaintiff still holds an interest in pursuing the litigation. The Rules
of Civil Procedure are meant to promote uniformity, and provide parties with rules of
“fair play”.150 Appellate decisions that allow an unaccepted offer of judgment to moot a
plaintiff’s claim before the plaintiff has proper opportunity to litigate frustrate justice.
The Supreme Court failed to grasp an opportunity to reconcile the opposing holdings a
few years prior. The result of the decision to not issue a firm holding in Genesis has been
controversy and confusion in the lower courts. In Re Tremont Holdings was another
missed opportunity for the Supreme Court to provide a necessary protection to plaintiffs
who are being abused by defendants who are abusing Rule 68 offers of judgment.
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